















































































Cryptocurrency, a kind of a decentralised virtual currency intended to be used as a 
means of payment has appeared and gained momentum in recent years. It has been 
widely used as a speculative tool, but also for money laundering, terrorism financing 
and in the black market economy. 
 
With the lack of any universal supervising authority, regulatory efforts to combat 
money laundering with cryptocurrency have been slow and inconsistent across 
jurisdictions. In the EU, it took almost ten years for it to be brought within the scope 
of the AML legislation. As yet untested, it is manifest that this legislation does not 
comprehensively address all the AML issues that cryptocurrencies create. 
 
This dissertation provides an analysis of the AML challenges posed by 
cryptocurrencies, the regulatory responses to these challenges in the EU and the 
UK, and offers potential solutions, primarily a suggestion to incentivise AML-
compliant cryptoassets through regulation. 
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issued	 or	 guaranteed	 by	 a	 central	 bank	 or	 a	 public	 authority,	 is	 not	
necessarily	attached	to	a	legally	established	currency	and	does	not	possess	































































































































































































































































































At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 crypto-assets	 varied	 among	
countries,	 absent	 a	 common	 taxonomy	 of	 crypto-assets,	 and	 a	 shared	








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































safeguard	private	 cryptographic	 keys	on	behalf	of	 its	 customers,	 to	hold,	
store	and	transfer	virtual	currencies’	(art	1	(2)).	
In	effect,	5th	AMLD	made	mandatory	for	virtual	currency	exchanges	and	custodian	wallet	
providers	to	register	with	the	nominated	supervisory	authority,	perform	CFT	and	ML	risk	
assessment,	comply	with	the	CDD,	and	report	suspicious	activity.117	
	
In	regards	to	the	central	database,	the	Directive	currently	prescribes	that	the	relevant	
information	be	made	accessible	to	FIUs,	and	calls	for	further	legislative	proposals	regarding	
the	database.	It	also	makes	provisions	for	the	further	assessment	of	the	option	for	
cryptocurrency	users	to	self-report	to	relevant	authorities.118		
	
Finally,	the	following	AML	Directive,	the	6th,	published	in	November	2018,	‘aims	to	combat	
money	laundering	by	means	of	criminal	law,	enabling	more	efficient	and	swifter	cross-
border	cooperation	between	competent	authorities’.119	While	it	does	not	address	the	virtual	
currency	aspect	of	the	ML	directly,	it	is	still	significant.	One	of	the	facilitating	aspects	of	ML	
through	VCs	is	precisely	the	ease	of	cross-border	transactions,	made	possible	by	the	lack	of	
cross-border	cooperation	of	public	authorities,	amongst	other	reasons.	Additionally,	the	
legal	and	regulatory	vacuum	and	inconsistencies	between	jurisdictions	also	paly	a	role	in	ML	
with	the	VCs.		
	
																																																						
117	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(April	2019)	17	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795670
/20190415_Consultation_on_the_Transposition_of_5MLD__web.pdf>	accessed	on	12	May	2019.	
118	5th	AML	Directive,	recital	(9)	and	art	1	(41)	1.	
119	6th	AML	Directive,	recital	(1).	
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4.3.	Regulatory	Response	to	the	Cryptocurrencies’	AML	Challenges	in	the	UK.	
	
In	the	UK,	the	government	first	concerned	itself	with	the	questions	of	regulation	for	
cryptocurrency	in	August	2014,	which	correlates	to	the	EU	developments	preceding	the	4th	
AMLD.120	The	first	UK	governmental	report,	‘Digital	currencies:	response	to	the	call	for	
information’,	was	released	in	March	2015	and	served	as	the	first	announcement	of	the	
government’s	intention	to	include	cryptocurrency	exchanges	into	the	scope	of	the	AML	
regulation.121	Following	this,	a	designated	Taskforce	was	created,	which	consists	of	the	main	
governmental	actors	of	the	UK	financial	sector	-	the	Bank	of	England,	the	Financial	Conduct	
Authority	(FCA)	and	Her	Majesty’s	Treasury	(HM	Treasury).	Their	Final	Report,	published	in	
October	2018,	is	the	result	of	the	large-scale	research	into	cryptoassets.122		
	
Notably,	the	UK	regulators	employ	the	notion	of	‘cryptoasset’,	as	opposed	to	‘virtual	
currency’	used	in	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	albeit	unsurprisingly,	the	Taskforce	states	that	
	
There	is	not	a	single	widely	agreed	definition	of	a	cryptoasset.	Broadly,	a	cryptoasset	is	a	
cryptographically	secured	digital	representation	of	value	or	contractual	rights	that	uses	
some	type	of	distributed	ledger	technology	and	can	be	transferred,	stored	or	traded	
electronically.123		
	
This	quasi-definition	extends	the	EU	definition	found	in	the	5th	AMLD	to	‘digital	
representation	of	contractual	rights’,	not	just	‘value’,	and	does	not	limit	‘cryptoassests’	to	
																																																						
120	HM	Treasury,	‘Digital	currencies:	responses	to	the	call	for	information’	March	2015	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414040
/digital_currencies_respo	nse_to_call_for_information_final_changes.pdf>	accessed	15	May	2019.	
121	Ibid.	
122	HM	Treasury,	FCA,	Bank	of	England,	‘Cryptoassets	Taskforce:	final	report’	October	2018	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752070
/cryptoassets_taskforce_final_report_final_web.pdf>	accessed	15	May	2019.	
123	Ibid	11.	
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only	decentralised	networks.	The	Taskforce	also	introduces	a	classification	of	cryptoassets,	
which	is	similar	to	that	of	EBA.124		
	
Figure	7:	The	Taskforce’s	Cryptoassets	Framework.125	
	
	
The	EU	Directives	have	to	be	transposed	into	the	national	law	of	member	states,	usually	
within	two	years.126	As	it	stands,	the	UK	is	set	to	leave	the	EU	before	the	5th	AMLD	is	due	to	
be	transposed	into	the	UK	law	on	10	January	2020.	However,	the	UK	government	prioritized	
the	transposition	of	the	directive	regardless	of	Brexit.127	The	EU	Withdrawal	Agreement	
included	the	terms	of	an	implementation	period,	and	‘the	government	is	catering	for	the	
scenario	where	an	implementation	period	is	in	place	after	the	UK	leaves	the	EU’.128			
	
																																																						
124	EBA,	‘Report	with	advice	for	the	European	Commission	on	crypto-assets’	(n	27)	7;	described	in	Chapter	2.	
125	Treasury,	FCA,	Bank	of	England	(n	122).	
126	EU,	‘Regulations,	Directives	and	Other	Acts’	<https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en>	
accessed	on	11	May	2019.	
127	House	of	Commons	Treasury	Committee,	‘Crypto-assets	Twenty-Second	Report	of	Session	2017–19’	(19	
September	2019)	28	<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/910/910.pdf>	
accessed	12	May	2019.	
128	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(n	117)	4.	
	
37	
HM	Treasury	is	the	leading	UK	authority	for	the	transposition	of	the	EU	AML	Directives.129	
On	15	April	2019,	HM	Treasury	released	a	consultation	paper,	seeking	the	responses	to	be	
submitted	up	until	10	June	2019.130	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	received	feedback	was	being	
analysed,	with	no	outcome	yet	released.		
	
The	UK	implementation	proposal	of	the	5th	AMLD	builds	on	the	Final	Report	of	the	Taskforce	
with	the	FCA	suggested	as	the	registering	authority.131	There	are	two	significant	differences	
from	the	EU	AMLD.	First,	the	UK	AML	scope	is	proposed	to	extend	to	all	cryptoassets,	not	
just	virtual	currencies,	which	in	case	with	the	5th	AMLD	mostly	refers	to	cryptocurrencies.	
Second,	HM	Treasury	acknowledges	that	‘illicit	activity	is	being	carried	out	at	various	points	
of	cryptoasset	exchange,	not	just	through	fiat-crypto	exchange	services’.	It	further	enquires	
whether	the	AML	regulation	should	include:	
•	crypto-to-crypto	exchange	service	providers		
•	peer-to-peer	exchange	service	providers		
•	Cryptoasset	Automated	Teller	Machines		
•	issuance	of	new	cryptoassets,	for	example	through	Initial	Coin	Offerings	
(ICOs)	
•	the	publication	of	open-source	software132	
Moreover,	the	Consultation	proactively	asks	if	there	are	other	types	of	cryptoassets,	and	
whether	its	definition	should	be	broadened,	thus	signalling	a	potential	to	include	all	existing	
and	possible	cryptoassets	into	scope.	The	HM	Treasury	also	seeks	further	guidance	on	its	
approach	to	‘privacy	coins’,	or	types	of	cryptocurrency	that	conceal	personal	information	
about	its	users.133		
	
																																																						
129	HM	Treasury,	‘About	Us’	<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury/about>	accessed	
14	May	2019.	
130	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(n	117).	
131	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(n	117)	18.	
132	Ibid.	
133	Ibid	19-21;	‘Privacy	Coin’	(Decryptionary)	<https://decryptionary.com/dictionary/privacy-coin/>	accessed	
20	August	2019.	
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In	addition	to	this,	HM	Treasury	notes	that	the	cross-border	nature	of	the	cryptoasset	
networks	makes	it	very	easy	to	circumvent	the	regulations	in	one	jurisdiction	by	setting	up	
operations	in	another.	The	Consultation	therefore	also	proposes	‘extending	the	reach	of	UK	
AML	laws	to	providers	who	are	located	outside	of	the	UK’	by	applying	them	
extraterritorially.134		
	
Notably,	the	UK	traditionally	goes	‘above	and	beyond’	when	transposing	the	EU	Directives	–	
a	phenomenon	known	as	‘gold-plating’.135	It	is	clear	that	5th	AMLD	won’t	be	an	exception.	
Gold-plating	is	criticised	as	negatively	affecting	law	harmonisation	and	international	
business,	and	is	officially	reserved	by	the	UK	government	for	exceptional	circumstances	
only.136	Nonetheless,	it	appears	to	be	justified	in	this	case.	While	it	is	not	possible	to	know	
the	exact	extent	of	the	gold-plating	now,	before	the	Directive	is	fully	implemented,	there	is	
a	clear	case	for	extending	the	5th	AMLD	virtual	currencies	provisions.	As	acknowledged	by	
the	UK	Taskforce	and	as	described	earlier	in	this	work,	‘anonymous	conversion	of	
cryptocurrency	to	fiat	currency	and	vice	versa’,	potentially	used	in	ML	schemes,	can	also	
happen	outside	of	the	regulated	realm	of	the	5th	AMLD.	Cryptocurrency	ATMs,	face-to-face	
exchanges,	schemes	involving	third-party	accounts	and	mixing	services	are	all	outside	the	
scope	of	5th	AMLD.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	UK	AML	regime	is	one	of	the	most	robust	out	
of	all	the	countries	assessed	by	FATF,	and	the	gold-plating	of	the	new	AMLD	is	also	in	line	
with	that.137	
	
The	counter-argument	to	this	initiative	is	the	perceived	hindrance	to	technological	and	
business	development	which	the	excessive	regulation	may	bring.	However,	this	does	not	
																																																						
134	Arun	Srivastava	and	others,	‘Money	Laundering	Update’	[2019]	167	Compliance	Officer	Bulletin	1,	9;	HM	
Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(n	117)	18.	
135	“Gold-plating	is	when	implementation	goes	beyond	the	minimum	necessary	to	comply	with	a	Directive,	by:	
extending	the	scope	…	etc.”	in	HM	Government,	‘Transposition	Guidance	-	How	to	implement	European	
Directives	effectively’	February	2018	8	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/682752
/eu-transposition-guidance.pdf>	accessed	15	May	2019.	It	is	claimed	that	the	UK	frequently	gold-plates	EU	
Directives,	for	example,	see	Chris	Davies,	‘Gold	Plating	of	EU	Laws	‘Has	Ended’	BBC	News	(24	April	2013)	
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22277927>	accessed	19	May	2019.	
136	HM	Government	(n	135)	3.	
137	FATF,	‘Anti-Money	Laundering	and	Counter-Terrorist	Financial	Measures;	United	Kingdom,	Mutual	
Evaluation	Report’	(December	2018)	<https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-united-kingdom-2018.html>	accessed	28	August	
2019.	
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seem	to	be	proportionate	here,	considering	that	the	scale	of	ML	with	the	use	of	bitcoin,	the	
most	widely-used	cryptocurrency,	is	close	to	50%	of	all	transactions.		
	
4.4.	Summary	of	the	EU	and	the	UK	AML	Regulation	for	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
As	discussed,	the	EU	provided	a	legal	definition	of	virtual	currencies	and	custodian	wallet	
providers,	admitted	their	ML	and	CTF	potential,	and	incorporated	them	into	the	existing	
AML	framework.	The	main	objective	of	the	5th	AMLD	is	to	deal	with	the	issue	of	anonymity.	
It	excluded	other	ML	risks	posed	by	virtual	currencies,	although	they	were	acknowledged	at	
the	Proposal	stage.	Additionally,	the	6th	AMLD	indirectly	addressed	the	problems	that	stem	
from	the	cross-border	nature	of	cryptoasset	networks	through	the	promotion	of	
international	cooperation	of	competent	authorities.		
	
The	UK	at	this	stage	is	likely	to	incorporate	into	its	AML	regulation	a	much	larger	number	of	
entities	and	types	of	cryptoassets.	It	is	also	likely	to	apply	its	AML	law	extraterritorially	to	
providers	outside	of	the	UK,	but	related	to	the	UK	business.	If	this	is	to	materialise,	the	UK	
VC	AML	regulations	will	have	a	knock-on	effect	outside	of	the	UK,	thus	overcoming	the	
limitations	of	5th	AMLD	to	an	extent.
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5.	Possible	Solutions	for	AML	Regulation	of	Virtual	Currencies	in	the	
EU	and	the	UK.	
	
5.1.	Proposals	for	Cryptocurrencies	Risk	Assessment	under	the	Existing	AML	Regime.	
	
It	is	clear	that	the	principle	of	the	current	AML	regulation	of	virtual	currencies	both	in	the	
EU	and	the	UK	is	to	expand	the	existing	AML	regime	to	include	cryptoassets	where	it	is	
feasible.	The	downside	of	this	approach	is	that	in	situations	where	the	existing	AML	regime	
is	not	readily	applicable,	no	alternative	provisions	are	made.	The	technical	questions,	such	
as	how	to	perform	CDD	and	risk	assessment	for	cryptoassets	users	and	institutions,	are	not	
addressed	either.	
	
Critical	literature	contains	some	suggestions	for	AML	risk	assessment	of	virtual	currency	
users.	Notably,	the	use	of	mixing	services	can	be	viewed	as	a	red	flag,	as	well	as	any	
obfuscation	of	the	financial	trail	preceding	the	purchase	of	a	cryptoasset,	and	concealing	the	
identities	of	the	wallet	owners.138	
	
Another	suggested	approach	to	monitoring	illegal	activity	is	through	data	analysis.	
Suggested	analysis	types	include	‘network	cluster	analysis’	and	‘detection	controlled	
estimation	(DCE)’,	which	have	already	been	successfully	applied	to	other	forms	of	
misconduct	such	as	tax	evasion	and	fraud.139	
	
Cluster	analysis	is	the	process	of	identifying	and	grouping	together	similar	objects	within	a	
dataset.	‘At	an	intuitive	level,	the	…	method	exploits	the	network	topology	–	the	
information	about	who	trades	with	whom’.140	In	the	applicable	context,	the	objects	could	be	
bitcoin	users	and	the	grouping	(or	clusters)	identifies	‘communities	of	users	based	on	the	
transactions	between	users’.141	This	clustering	can	then	be	applied	to	a	sample	of	known	
																																																						
138	Naheem	(n	88)	562,	570.		
139	Foley,	Karlsen,	Putniņš	(n	63).	
140	Ibid.	
141	Ibid.	
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illegal	and	legitimate	bitcoin	users,	who	could	have	been	identified	through	bitcoin	seizures	
by	law	enforcement	and	on	dark	web	forums,	for	example.	The	result	of	such	analysis	is	an	
estimation	of	the	level	of	relatedness	from	any	one	bitcoin	user	to	a	cluster	of	other	bitcoin	
users.	If	the	user	has	a	high	degree	of	relatedness	to	a	cluster	classed	as	legitimate,	this	user	
has	a	high	likelihood	to	be	legitimate	as	well.	If	the	cluster	the	user	relates	to	is	not	
legitimate	–	the	user	is	likely	to	be	involved	in	misconduct.	Network	cluster	analysis	can	be	
applied	via	many	different	algorithms;	however,	none	can	guarantee	a	complete	accuracy	of	
detection.		
	
Another	analytical	tool,	DCE,	‘exploits	the	differences	in	the	characteristics	of	legal	and	
illegal	users	of	bitcoin	to	probabilistically	identify	the	population	of	illegal	users’.142	That	is,	
by	looking	at	the	particular	characteristics	of	a	bitcoin	user’s	behaviour,	it	is	possible	to	
assign	them	a	specific	risk	rating.	Examples	of	characteristics	used	in	this	analysis	could	be	
attempts	to	conceal	identity	by	using	mixing	services,	propensity	to	trade	in	privacy	coins	or	
even	time-series	variables	which	highlight	a	correlation	between	the	time	of	activity	on	dark	
web	marketplaces	and	the	time	when	a	user	transacts.		
	
Both	network	cluster	analysis	and	DCE	can	only	estimate	the	likelihood	that	a	user	is	
involved	in	illicit	activities,	and	cannot	constitute	a	proof	of	a	predicate	offence	by	itself.	
However,	using	different	analysis	types	concurrently	allows	a	better	quality	of	results.	Given	
that	blockchain	is	an	open	ledger,	it	is	also	possible	to	conduct	some	analysis	without	
attracting	attention.	Expanding	on	this	idea	even	further,	there	is	a	potential	for	using	
Artificial	Intelligence	(AI)	tools	for	finding	suspicious	users	and	transactions.
																																																						
142	Ibid.	
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5.2.	Intractability	of	AML	with	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
An	overview	of	the	analytical	literature	shows	that	while	it	is	universally	agreed	that	ML	is	
amongst	the	highest	risks	posed	by	virtual	currencies,	there	are	very	limited	attempts	to	
offer	solutions	beyond	that	of	including	cryptoassets	into	the	scope	of	the	existing	AML	
regulation.	This	leads	us	to	the	conclusion	that	while	there	are	plentiful	opportunities	for	
using	VCs	for	money	laundering,	there	is	currently	no	effective	way	to	combat	it	in	its	
entirety,	and	no	indication	that	there	will	be	one	in	the	future.	Importantly,	there	is	also	a	
limited	incentive	for	the	competent	authorities	to	do	so,	simply	because	no	single	authority	
is	responsible	for	regulating	cryptocurrencies.	Decentralised	cryptocurrencies	do	not	have	
any	central	governing	body,	thus	existing	in	a	vacuum	where	there	is	no	organisation	that	
can	accept	the	responsibility	for	regulating	them,	and	therefore	no	one	to	blame	for	any	
shortcomings.		
	
5.3.	Other	Possible	Solutions.	
	
5.3.1.	Supranational	Regulation.	
	
There	is	a	widespread	opinion	that	AML	regulation	for	virtual	currencies	at	state	level	won’t	
be	sufficient	to	combat	cross-border	ML.	Therefore,	a	supranational	regulator	is	required.	
Some	researchers	even	propose	the	EU	and	the	IMF	as	possible	candidate.143	The	author,	
however,	would	argue	that	this	suggestion	is	far	from	ideal.	No	authority	is	able	to	
completely	control	development,	modification	and	use	of	cryptocurrencies,	because	they	do	
not	require	an	authority	to	exist.	Cryptocurrency	networks	are	nothing	other	than	an	
internet	activity,	which	cannot	be	completely	controlled	even	in	restrictive	countries	like	
China	because	of	circumventing	technologies	such	as	TOR	or	VPN.	Similarly,	solutions	
prescribing	requirements	for	the	cryptocurrency	protocol,	such	as	adding	user	identification	
details	or	ML	provisions,	would	be	pointless,	because	there	is	nothing	stopping	the	creation	
																																																						
143	Stratiev	(n	50)	187;	Prof.	Dr	Robby	Houben,	‘Cryptocurrencies	from	a	money	laundering	and	tax	evasion	
perspective’	[2019]	30	International	Company	and	Commercial	Law	Review	261,	26.	
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of	new	cryptocurrencies	without	such	provisions	and	with	increased	anonymity,	such	as	
‘privacy	coins’.	
	
Additionally,	the	efficiency	of	existing	global	bodies	tasked	with	financial	regulation	is	
questionable.	Often,	there	exists	a	considerable	disparity	between	their	de	jure	and	de	facto	
scope,	with	the	IMF	a	case	in	point.144				
	
5.3.2.	Prohibition	as	a	Solution.	
	
In	this	light,	perhaps	an	outright	ban	on	cryptocurrency	would	be	merited?	The	author	
would	argue	that	while	it	can	serve	as	a	deterrent	and	potentially	devalue	cryptocurrencies,	
it	is	not	a	viable	solution.	As	discussed	above,	ultimately	there	is	no	way	to	have	full	control	
over	the	creation	and	use	of	cryptocurrency	networks,	including	points	of	exchange	
between	FC	and	VC.	Therefore,	there	can	be	no	sanctions	for	violation	of	the	prohibition.		
	
5.3.3.	Incentivising	AML-Compliant	Cryptoassets	as	a	Solution.	
	
Since	neither	prohibition	nor	central	management	of	all	cryptocurrencies	is	feasible,	the	
regulators	could	incentivise	users	towards	more	AML-compliant	cryptocurrencies,	thus	
potentially	marginalising	the	rogue	ones.	This	could	be	done	by	obliging	cryptocurrency	
exchanges	and	other	service	providers	to	only	allow	cryptocurrencies	whose	inherent	
characteristics	permit	AML	monitoring.	This	will	automatically	mark	non-complaint	
cryptocurrencies	and	their	users	as	suspicious,	potentially	decreasing	their	price	in	fiat	
currency	and	therefore	their	market	share	and	utility	for	ML.	There	also	could	be	a	provision	
to	include	any	instances	of	suspicious	cryptocurrencies	into	the	compulsory	AML	reporting,	
for	the	authorities	to	investigate.		
	
Going	further,	the	requirement	to	register	with	the	relevant	authority	(likely	to	be	the	FCA	
in	the	UK)	could	be	extended	from	the	exchange	or	crypto	services	provider	to	new	
																																																						
144	See,	for	example,	Norman	Mugarura,	‘The	IMF,	Its	Mandate	and	Influence	in	Prevention	of	Financial	Sector	
Abuse’	[2016]	23	Journal	of	Financial	Crime	987;	Ngaire	Woods,	‘Making	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank	More	
Accountable’	[2001]	77	International	Affairs	85,	89.	
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cryptocurrencies	when	they	are	created.	The	current	number	of	active	cryptocurrencies	that	
are	known	to	exist,	ten	years	after	bitcoin	was	created,	is	just	below	2,500.	This	is	
comparable	to	the	quantity	of	other	types	of	entities	regulated	by	the	FCA,	and	therefore	
should	be	a	realistic	figure	to	oversee.145	Alternatively,	new	cryptocurrencies	could	be	
overseen	directly	by	the	exchanges.	Similar	to	stock	exchanges	imposing	their	requirements	
on	a	traded	stock,	AML	requirements	could	be	applied	to	cryptocurrencies	before	they	are	
admitted	for	trading.		
	
Fundamentally,	the	only	reliable	way	to	regulate	cryptocurrencies	is	by	amending	the	
protocol	which	defines	them.	As	pointed	out	in	section	4.1,	cryptocurrency	networks	are	
designed	to	be	effectively	regulated	by	their	protocols,	and	it	is	not	possible	to	maintain	
control	over	them	through	traditional	external	channels.146	Therefore,	the	source	code	of	a	
new	cryptocurrency	could	be	submitted	for	a	review	before	the	launch,	with	the	
requirement	to	specify	how	the	cryptocurrency	addresses	AML	requirements.	Once	
approved,	the	cryptocurrency	can	receive	its	verifiable	registration	details	from	the	FCA,	or	
from	the	exchange,	and	subsequently	be	made	available	to	users.	This	will	attract	legitimate	
users	of	the	cryptocurrency	market	to	the	AML-complaint	cryptocurrencies,	and	to	protect	
these	currencies	from	being	used	in	ML.	It	will	also	shift	the	responsibility	of	developing	
AML	controls	from	the	regulators	to	the	cryptocurrency	creators,	thus	reducing	the	cost	of	
regulation	for	the	state	and	potentially	making	AML	controls	more	functional	since	they	are	
added	at	the	creation	stage	of	the	protocol.	In	the	case	of	existing	cryptocurrencies,	the	
same	requirement	of	providing	a	‘prospectus’	detailing	AML	characteristics	could	be	applied	
to	them	retroactively.	This	would	effectively	mean	‘forking’	them	and	then	allowing	the	use	
of	the	compliant	fork	only.	
	
Of	course,	this	will	not	eliminate	rogue	cryptocurrencies	from	the	market	completely	–	it	is	
not	possible.	But	this	will	considerably	marginalise	them	and	automatically	mark	their	users	
																																																						
145	FCA,	‘About	the	FCA	(FCA,	21	April	2016,	updated	30	July	2019)	<https://www.fca.org.uk/about/the-fca>	
accessed	28	August	2019.			
146	The	idea	of	modifying	a	cryptocurrency	protocol	to	implement	AML	provisions	was	mentioned	at	the	
University	of	Glasgow,	College	of	Social	Sciences,	‘Cryptocurrencies	and	Financial	Crime	Compliance:	
opportunities	for	new	regulatory	paradigms?’	(PhD	Proposal,	supervisor	Dr.	Micheál	O’Flynn)	
<https://www.gla.ac.uk/scholarships/cossphdscholarshipcryptocurrenciesandfinancialcrimecomplianceopport
unitiesfornewregulatoryparadigms/>	accessed	28	March	2019.	
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as	potential	money	launderers,	thus	depleting	their	capitalisation	by	separating	the	funds	of	
law	abiding	users	and	criminals.	Ultimately,	it	could	even	lead	to	the	nullification	of	the	
value	of	these	cryptocurrencies	in	fiat	currency,	thus	making	it	useless	for	money	laundering	
purposes.	In	the	case	of	bitcoin	and	some	(though	not	all)	other	cryptocurrencies,	their	
monetary	value	is	not	inherent	and	not	guaranteed,	but	always	determined	by	the	market	
demand.	When	it	first	appeared,	bitcoin	had	no	value	in	fiat	currency.	Therefore	it	is	
possible,	at	least	theoretically,	to	revert	the	market	price	of	a	cryptocurrency	back	to	zero,	if	
there	is	no	demand	for	it.	In	the	case	of	cryptocurrencies	with	a	finite	number	of	units,	such	
as	bitcoin,	bringing	the	value	of	the	cryptocurrency	down	to	miniscule	numbers	would	have	
the	same	effect	as	nullifying	it	completely.	The	usability	of	rogue	cryptocurrencies	will	also	
be	limited,	since	it	won’t	be	possible	to	use	them	at	any	regulated	point	of	exchange,	
potentially	including	whole	regions	such	as	the	EU.		
	
The	mandatory	technical	characteristics	of	an	AML-compliant	cryptocurrencies	could	be	
built	into	their	protocol	and	based	on	the	existing	AML	legislation,	then	updated	in	due	
course.	In	this	model,	an	introduced	requirement	could	be	the	addition	of	a	transaction	
receipt	to	the	blockchain,	generated	using	existing	cryptographic	techniques	which	
unequivocally	verifies	that	the	rules	of	the	protocol	have	been	followed	and	who	approved	
the	transaction.	This	model	allows	the	cryptocurrency	to	remain	decentralised	while	also	
providing	the	authorities	with	sufficient	means	to	adequately	monitor	transactions.	
	
For	example,	the	5th	EU	AML	Directive	implies	a	ban	on	anonymous	accounts	of	any	kind.147	
For	an	AML-compliant	cryptocurrency,	this	could	mean	requiring	all	wallets	to	be	
authenticated	and	marked	by	a	qualified	body	only	after	the	provision	of	sufficient	user	
identification	details.	Then,	any	transaction	request	would	check	whether	the	associated	
wallets	are	authenticated	or	not,	and	reject	transactions	involving	unverified	wallets.	In	this	
way,	cryptocurrency	payments	and	transfers	would	be	tracked	in	a	similar	way	to	how	
banking	transactions	are	tracked	today,	except	that	the	authorities	would	have	immediate	
access	to	the	public	ledger.	
	
																																																						
147	5th	AML	Directive,	recital	(20).	
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Another	new	requirement	of	the	5th	EU	AMLD	is	the	decrease	to	the	CDD	threshold	to	150	
euro	per	month.148	Here	each	AML-compliant	cryptocurrency	network	could	apply	specific	
rules	dependent	on	the	size	of	the	transfer,	that	is,	having	the	nodes	of	the	network	which	
verify	each	transaction,	policing	users	exceeding	the	threshold	and	denying	transaction	
verification	before	a	CDD	can	be	completed	by	a	qualified	authority.	The	same	imposition	of	
rules	into	the	cryptocurrency	protocol	could	be	used	to	meet	other	AML	requirements	and	
safeguards.	
	
While	computer	science	efforts	may	be	needed	to	finalise	the	design,	we	would	expect	
these	AML-compliant	cryptocurrencies	to	fundamentally	retain	many	of	the	benefits	of	
today’s	cryptocurrencies.	We	would	expect	lower	transaction	fees,	faster	transactions	and	a	
reduction	in	fraud.	In	addition,	the	overheads	of	regulating	such	a	system	would	benefit	
from	the	same	efficiencies	that	cryptocurrency	transactions	enjoy	today,	that	is,	a	
decentralised	system	which	is	effectively	self	fulfilling.		
	
AML-compliant	cryptocurrencies	may	provide	the	balance	between	freedom	and	control	
that	is	needed,	and	indeed	may	even	be	inevitable	over	the	long	term.		
	
5.3.3.1.	Potential	Problems	of	the	Incentivising	of	AML-Compliant	Cryptoassets.	
	
There	are	a	few	issues	with	this	model.	First,	there	is	a	distinct	danger	of	stifling	innovation	
by	imposing	costly	regulatory	requirements.	Current	EU	and	UK	AML	provisions	already	are	
widely	criticised	as	disproportionate.	Most	of	the	cost	of	AML	compliance	lies	with	the	
private	sector,	and	the	AML	regime	progressively	keeps	getting	stricter	and	therefore	more	
expensive.149	There	is	neither	recognition	nor	compensation	for	adherence	to	the	AML	
requirements.	This	is	done	with	the	backdrop	of	virtually	non-existent	evidence	of	the	
																																																						
148	5th	AML	Directive,	art	1	(7)(a)(i).	
149	See,	for	example,	Anna	Odby,	‘The	European	Union	and	Money	Laundering:	the	Preventive	Responsibilities	
of	the	Private	Sector’	in	Bantekas,	Keramidas	(n	3);	Campbell	(n	111);	Nicholas	Ryder,	‘Is	It	Time	to	Reform	the	
Counter-Terrorist	Financing	Reporting	Obligations?	On	the	EU	and	UK	System’	[2018]	19	German	Law	Journal	
1169.	
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efficiency	of	the	AML	regime,	since	its	effect	cannot	be	easily	quantified.150	This	makes	
private	sector	question	the	merits	of	the	regime	and	causes	widespread	discontent.151	
	
Some	of	the	EU	and	UK	AML	requirements	are	conflicting	with	human	rights.	The	implicit	
ban	on	anonymity	and	the	move	towards	databases	of	personal	data,	for	example,	are	quite	
problematic	for	the	right	to	privacy	and	the	EU	data	protection	laws.152	
	
However,	the	risk	of	ML	using	cryptocurrencies	is	so	significant	that	it	cannot	be	
disregarded.	This	will	also	put	cryptocurrencies	together	with	all	the	regulated	financial	
products,	thus	levelling	the	playing	field	rather	than	disadvantaging	any	market	actors.	
Considering	that	the	addition	of	AML	provisions	could	potentially	increase	the	capitalisation	
of	the	cryptocurrency	by	attracting	investors	who	do	not	want	to	be	associated	with	the	
rogue	cryptocurrencies,	this	could	also	be	viewed	as	an	easy	way	to	add	value.	Compliance	
with	AML	requirements	could	be	a	selling	point	of	new	and	existing	cryptocurrencies	on	par	
with	other	technical	characteristics.		
	
Another	issue	is	the	poor	law	harmonisation	between	jurisdictions,	and	regulatory	
arbitrage.	Since	AML	requirements	can	differ	around	the	world,	compliant	cryptocurrencies	
in	one	jurisdiction	might	not	be	considered	as	such	in	another.	Moreover,	there	are	
jurisdictions	already	accepting	existing	cryptocurrencies	as	a	means	of	payment	without	any	
AML	changes	to	the	protocol,	such	as	Japan	and	Switzerland.	This,	however,	could	be	
overcome	by	agreeing	to	the	same	AML	principles	for	cryptocurrencies	on	an	international	
level,	for	example,	through	FATF	Recommendations.	
																																																						
150	Ibid;	Peter	Alan	Sproat,	'An	Evaluation	of	the	UK's	Anti-Money	Laundering	and	Asset	Recovery	Regime'	
[2007]	47	Crime	Law	and	Social	Change	169.	
151	See,	for	example,	Campbell	(n	111);	Andrew	Haynes,	‘Money	laundering:	from	failure	to	absurdity’	[2008]	
11	Journal	of	Money	Laundering	Control	303.	
152	See,	for	example,	Campbell	(n	111).	
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6.	Conclusion.	
	
The	paper	has	critically	examined	the	phenomenon	of	cryptocurrency-based	money	
laundering	and	the	current	EU	and	UK	legislative	efforts	to	combat	it.	It	has	identified	
unresolved	issues	and	offered	potential	solutions.	Given	the	emerging	nature	and	the	
technical	complexity	of	the	field,	a	comprehensive	background	information	on	virtual	
currencies	has	also	been	analysed	and	provided.		
	
It	has	been	found	that	the	questions	of	the	AML	regulation	of	virtual	currencies	is	largely	an	
intractable	one,	at	least	in	the	present	circumstances.	However,	it	does	not	mean	that	the	
AML	regulation	cannot	be	improved	upon.	The	paper	summarises	proposed	methods	for	
CDD	and	AML	risk	assessment	for	cryptocurrency	networks,	discusses	different	ideas	to	
combat	cryptocurrency-based	ML,	and	finally	describes	a	potential	path	to	the	minimisation	
of	money	laundering	with	the	use	of	VCs	through	AML	regulation.		
	
It	is	clear	today	that	the	main	technological	break-through	behind	cryptocurrencies	is,	
ironically,	not	the	‘currency’	aspect	of	it.	Advantages	of	cryptocurrency	as	a	payment	
method,	such	as	decentralisation,	financial	inclusion	and	transactional	speed,	are	countered	
by	poor	usability,	serious	limitations	in	consumer	protection	and	extreme	volatility	–	the	
very	aspects	that	are	the	responsibility	of	the	competent	authorities	in	case	of	government-
controlled	fiat	currencies.	It	is	the	system	allowing	for	functional	decentralisation,	the	DLT,	
that	has	proven	the	most	advantageous.153	Perhaps,	this	system	could	be	re-applied	to	the	
cryptoassets	to	build	financial	products	that	could	not	be	used	for	illicit	purposes	so	easily,	
once	our	understanding	of	their	potential	improves.		
	
It	has	been	established	that	money	laundering	is	always	a	consequence	of	a	preceding	
crime.	The	question	of	its	complete	elimination	is	therefore	the	question	of	the	possibility	of	
eliminating	crime	in	general,	which	has	not	been	possible	so	far.	Today,	the	primary	
objective	of	anti-money	laundering	regulation	is	not	to	annihilate	it,	but	to	make	the	money	
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laundering	process	as	complex	and	expensive	for	criminals	as	possible.	If	the	cost	of	money	
laundering	exceeds	the	value	of	criminal	proceeds,	it	can	render	the	associated	crime	
pointless.154	Disincentivising	rogue	cryptoasset	initiatives	in	favour	of	AML-complaint	ones	
would	be	very	much	in	line	with	the	contemporary	AML	goal.	
																																																						
154	See,	for	example,	Hans	Geiger	and	Oliver	Wuensch,	‘The	Fight	Against	Money	Laundering.	An	Economic	
Analysis	of	a	Cost-Benefit	Paradox’	[2007]	10	Journal	of	Money	Laundering	Control	91.	
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